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1.  IN'rRoouc·rroN 
·1. 1  At the  meeting of  the Council  of Ministers  on· 4  November  1985  the Cornmis-
s_ion  stated that it would. present  a ·report .to ·the  Council  on  the  enforce-
ment  of  the  common  fisheries policy in the Member  States.  This  statement. 
was  made  during  a  debate  on  a  Commission proposal  for  amendments  to Regu-
lation  (.EEC)  No  2057/82.establishing certain control  measures  for  fishing 
activities  by  vessels  of  the  Member  States  ( 1).  The  present  report 
therefore  addresses  primarily  the  question  of  the  enforcement  of  those 
provisions  of  the  common  fisheries  policy  which  are  designed  to  ensure 
the  conservation of  fishery  resources. 
1. 2  The  central  importance  of  such  enforcement  has  been  widely  recognized. 
The  Commission  has  stated in its programme ·for  1986  that it is "ir.lperat.i-
ve  to  ensure  that  the  policy  is  effectively  implemented  and  its  rules 
respected".  For  its  part  the  European  Parliament  has  also  given  muc:-. 
attention  to  the  enforcement  of  the  common  fisheries  policy.  Withou': 
proper  enforcement,  conservation  would  be  threatened  and  the  Community's 
international  f{sheries  relations  would  ~uffer.  Moreover,  the  many  res-
trictions  which  Community  fisheries  legislation places  on  fish.:.:1g  activi-
ties  in  order  to  conserve  resources  in  the  general  interest will  only  b~ 
accepted  by  fishermen  in  the  longer  term  on  the  understanding  that  the::: 
will  be  equally  enforced  by  all  the  Member  States  concerned.  A  prope:-
level  of  enforcement  is  thus  not  only  a  legal  duty  laid  upon  -::he  Membe::-
States  but  also  a  political  necessity  in  whose  absence  the  conse::-vatio~ 
component  of  the  common  fisheries  policy  would ·lose  creditility  anc 
respect. 
1. 3  The  basic  enfoc.cement  system  has  now  been  in  force  for  rather  :nor-e  t:-.il.:-. 
th rec  year.  s  and  it  is  an  appropriate  moment  to  rev  ie·,.;  progress  in  ;::-:e 
light of  the  experience  gained. 
./. 
I 1)  Subseyuently  reterred  to  in  this  report  as  the  Control  Regulatic~. - 2  -
1.4  The  Control  Regulation  lays  on  the  Member  States the  primary  responsibi-
lity  for  enforcing  the  conservation  provisions  of  the  common  fisheries 
policy.  In  examining  the  extent  to  which  the  Member  States  meet  their 
obligations  on  enforcement  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  individual 
situations  from  two  viewpoints.  Firstly, although  Community legislation 
in  this  field  is  directly  applicable,  each  Member  State  must  also  have 
available  a  legislative,  judicial  and  administrative  structure  enabling 
it to  meet  the  obligations  imposed  by  the  Community  rules,  e.g.  to provi-
de  for  sufficiently dissuasive  sanctions  in case  of  infringements against 
the  technical  conservation  measures  or  to prohibit  fishing provisionally 
in accordance  with  Article  10  of  the  Control  Regulation.  This  aspect is 
referred  to  in  Section  2  of  this  Report.  Secondly,  it is  necessary  for 
each  Member  State  to  devote  an  adequate  amount  of  human  and  material 
resources  to  the  execution  of  its  enforcement  duties.  The  amount  of 
resources  nominally  devoted  to  fisheries  enforcement  by  each  of  the  Mem-
ber  States  concerned  which  replied to  the ·commission's  questionnaire-on 
this  subject  is  shown  in  Annex  I 
replied. 
Spain  and  Portugal  have  not  yet 
1.5  The  real  performance  achieved  by  each  Member  State  by  the  use  of  these 
legislative,  judicial,  administrative,  human  and  material  resources  is 
considered  in  Section  3  of  the  Report,  leading  to  some  general  comments 
on  the  state of  enforcement  in the  Community. 
1. 6  The  report  then  considers,  in  Section  4,  the  part  which  the  Cor:unission 
plays  and  should  play  in  the  enforcement  of  the  commo:1  fisheries  policy 
before  drawing  some  overall  conclusions  in Section  5. 
. I  . 
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2.  LEGISLATIVE,  JUDICIAL  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE  STRUCTURES  IN  THE  MEMBER  STATES 
2. 1.  As  stated  above_,  .community· legislation  on  conservation  and  enforcement· 
r~quires. national ·measures  to ·give  it full  effect.  It  is  .therefore  a 
matter  of  concern  that not  all Member  States  have  adopted all the  neces-
sary  national  measures.  For  example,  it appears  that  the  United Kingdom 
in  respect  of  vessels  under  10  m  and  Belgium  in  respect  of  all  vessels 
cannot  provisionally  prohibit  fishing  as  required  by  Article  10  of  the 
Control  Regulatio~ within  the  time-scale  afforded  by  their  catch-predic-
tion  systems.  France until  recently  could not  enforce Commission  Regula-
.  .  . 
tio~s  ~topping  fishing  under  Article  10  wit~oui  a  nati6nal  measure 
published  several  weeks  after  the  Commission  Regulation.  Ireland  could 
not  enforce  certain  provisions  of  the  Council's  annual  Regulations  0:1 
fishing  by  third country vessels  in Community  waters  in  1985  until  Nov~~­
ber of  that year. 
2.2  The  Commission  has  therefore put  in hand  a  comprehensive  inquiry  into  t~e 
adequacy  of  Member States'  national  legislation  and  judicial and adminis-
trative  structures  required  for  proper  enforcement  of  the  Community  mea-
sures ..  Meanwhile,  the  comments  about·national  legislation  made  late!':.:-. 
this report  should  be  regarded  as provisional. 
3.  REAL  PERFORMANCE  OF 'THE  MEMBER STATES  IN  ENFORCEMENT 
J. 1  Th(.;!  importance  o"f  the  correct  enforcement  of  the  common  fisheries  p0li:::· 
has  led  the  Commission  to  maintain  a  close  interest  in  the  way  i:1  •,:hi::-. 
each  Member  State  concerned  organises  and  carries  out  its  enfc::c-er:~e:-.:. 
duties  and  in  its  failures  and  successes.  The  Commission  has  be~n  ab:~ 
lo  examine  the  various  national  situations  at  first  hand·and  over  a  ~c~­
.•_;i.derable  period,  ·particula-rly  through  the  missions  carried· out·  by  :.:.·s 
.·fisheries. inspectors  and  through  clo~e contacts  between  other ·com:nissi:::-: 
officials  and  Member  State officials concerned with  enforcement • 
.  ;. 
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3.2  The  following pages  summarise  the position in each Member State according 
to  the ·information in the  possession  of  the  Commission  on  30  April  1986. 
on  certain  points  investigations  are  continuing  and  the  conclusions  ex-
pressed  may  be  subject  to  review.  Attention  is  drawn  in particular  to 
. apparent ·weaknesses  in Member  State  enfo:J;"cernent::_.performance. 
3. 3  Belgium 
3. 3. 1  Although  quotas  are  not  distributed  among  fishing  vessels  in  Belgium, 
there  would  not  seem  to  have  been  any  large-scale  overfishing,  a  situa-
tion  which  may,  in part,  be  attributed to the·fact that  there  appears  to 
be  no  substantial overcapacity in the  fishing  t'leet. 
3. 3. 2  The  catch-recording  system  operates  on  the  basis  of  figures  supplied  by 
the  a~ctions where  vessels  land  their  catches..  The  data  are  coordinated 
at  the  competent  ministry,  which  cross-checks  the  data  supplied  by  the 
auctions  with  the  landing declarations. 
3. 3. 3  However,  some  catches  escape  recording  at  the  auctions  they  are  unde-
clc1red  because  they  are  sold  outside  the  auc:tions  to  ·restaurants  and 
wholesalers.  This  black  market,  which,  according  to  the  information  at 
the  COirunission' s  disposal,  frequently  concerns  sole,  is  concealed  by 
means  of  false  declarations  in the  logbooks.  Although  Belgium  has  taken 
steps  to  stamp it out,  a  certain black market still exists. 
.;. 
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3. 3. 4  -When  a.  quota  is· exhausted,  Belgium  is. unable  to· call_ a  provisional  halt 
to £ishing by .introducing a  national measure  as  the· necessary legislative 
procedure  is  too  -cumbersome.  . More  precisely,- . Belgium  would  hav.e  to 
publish--a  decree  which-·would. take.  one· or  two  months- to  come  into  force • 
. -Belgium  is  thus  committing  an  infringement- of  Article  10( 2 t  of  .the_ 
Control  Regulation.  It  therefore  depends. on  Commission  Regulat·ions  in 
order  to halt fishing  and  to  impose  penalties  in  the  event  of  failure  to 
comply  with  the  prohibition  imposed.  However,  Belgium  usually  supplies 
the  relevant  .information  in  time  for  the  Commission  to  adopt  the 
necessary  regulation  before  the quota is exhausted. 
3. 3. 5- .  .The  control  system is  underdeveloped.  Belgium  intends  to set· up  an  inde-
pendent- inspection  service  but  has, not  yet- done ·•so.  .Responsibility  for 
, c_o_n-tr.ol  is· currently.:.shared- between ·-various -depa.r.tments  and .results  in· .a 
not  altogether rational  deployment  of- inspection staff. 
3.3.6  Checks  at  sea  focus  on  fishing  for  flat  fish  in  the  twelve  r..ile  zor.e. 
The  main  problems  encountered  concern  illegal  fishing  by  certain  bea::-, 
trawlers  exceed.ing  70  grt  or  300  bhp  and  non-compliance  wit:,  certa.:.:1 
other  technical  measures  such  as  the  use  of  certain  unauthorized  attac~-
ments.  Checks  at  sea  are  hampered  by  the  inexperience  of  the  .:..:1spectio:-. 
staff,  their  unfamiliarity  with  Community  rules  and  ineffective  ::~etho:::s 
of  pursuing  infringements. 
}" ··:..:  !',  ~/.~ 
.  :.·.:.·.: .. 
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3.4  Denmark 
3.4.1  The  Danish  catch  registration  system  is  based  mainly  on  sales notes  cor-
related with  logbooks.  Since  there is almost  no  physical  control  of  the 
quantity  of  each  species  landed  by  a  vessel,  the  system  is  very  much 
dependent  on  the proper and  timely  forwarding  of  both  documents  to Copen-
hagen  and  on  the  amount  of  cross-checking  carried out  there.  There  are 
indications  of  problems  in  this  area  but  the  Danish  authorities  are  ta-
king  steps  to accelerate the  transmission of  sales data;  they maintain in 
any  event  that  cross-checks  with  the  customs  and  tax authorities prevent 
under-declaration of  catches. 
3.4.2  There  was  a  weakness  in  the  ~ase of  landings  by  Dutch  vessels  in  Danish 
ports  to  be  transported  to  the  Netherlands  as  no ·sale  took  place  in 
Denmark.  The  registration  of  such  landings  relied  substantially  on 
information  from·the  harbour  authorities  which  did not  carry  out  checks. 
Since  such  transit landings  could  only  be  checked  with  difficulty in  the 
Netherlands  they  were  virtually uncontrolled.  The  position  now  appears 
to  have  improved  somewhat. 
3.4.3  The  lack  of  spot  checks  also  probably  permitted  fishermen  in  the 
Skaggerak  and Kattegat  in  1985  to register as  other species  landings  that 
should  have  been  registered as sprat. 
3. 4. 4  Denmark  has  various  systems  for  managing  its  quotas  and  avoiding  over-
fishing  such as  quarterly  sub-quotas,  individual  vessel  quotas  and  com- -· 
pulsory  lay-up periods.  Over  the  past  three  years  Denmark's  record  for 
preventing overfishing appears  to have  improved. 
3.4.5  However,  the  overfishing of  sprat  in  ICES  area  IIIa  durin~'1985  req~ires 
comment.  The  Danish  authorities ·were  obliged  to  allow  the ·quota  mar.age-
ment  system to  lapse  and  were  then  faced  with  strong resistance  fro~ the 
industry to  enforcement  of  the quota. 
.;  . 
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In  an  apparent attempt to reduce the pressure the authorities permitted a 
fishery  which  led  to- landings  of  undersized whiting.  The  proper control 
of . the  Ilia  sprat  ·fishery  will  require  the  careful  attention  .of  the 
national authorities in future. 
3.4.6  Generally,  the  industrial  fisheries  constitute  the  major  problem  facing 
the  Danish  authorities  in  ensuring· compliance  with  the  technical  censer-
vation  measures.  Excessive  by-catches  of mainly  immature  herring in  the 
west  coast  sprat fishery  in  1983  and  more  general  problems  of by-catches 
in  industrial  fisheries  led  Denmark  to  set  up  a  "flying  corps"  of 
inspectors  with  special  responsibility  for  sampling  industrial  catches. 
This  appears  to have  had  some  success in coping with the problem. 
3. 4. 7  The  control  at  sea  appears  effective  but  is  limited  by  deficiencies  of 
equipment  and budgetary problems. 
3.4.8  Generally,  the  Danish authorities  have  shown  readiness  to enforce  unpop~­
lar control measures  and  they  have  enjoyed some  successes. 
3.5  Germany 
3. 5. 1  .The  catch  recording  system  is  based  on  cross-checks  between  sales  notes 
of  the  auctions  or  buyers,  landing declarations,  logbooks  and,  for  free..,. 
zer-trawlers,  discharge  statements  •.  Except  in  the  case  ·of  freezer-
trawlers  there  seems  to.be little physical -control  of  landings  but· never-
theless  this  system  based· ·on  paper  appears  to  work  correctly;  almost  no 
evidence  __  of  incorrect  registration  has  been  found.  It  may  be  noted, 
however, r-that  few. of.·Germany' s  quotas  are under pressure. 
.;  . 
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3.5.2  The  system  for  preventing  overfishing  and  managing  quotas  relies  on  the 
grant of  general or specific licences  to fish;  the  German  authorities  are 
able  to stop fishing by their fleet within  two  to three days,  a  timescale 
which,  in  conjunction  with  the  efficient  catch  recording  system;  has 
allowed  Germany  to  show  an  improvement  over  the  past  three  years  in  its 
record on overfishing. 
3.5.3  There is very little problem with breaches  of  technical measures  discove- · 
rable  in ports  and  the  control is adequate.  The  position is rather dif-
ferent  at sea,  particularly in  the  important  fishing  area  of  the  German 
Bight  where  there  are  problems  with  undersized . fish,  undersized-mesh 
nets,  illegal  attachments  to  nets  and  unauthorized  beam-trawling  within 
twelve  miles.  In  relation  to  the  area  of  sea  to  be  covered  Germany  is 
well  provided. with  fishery  protection  vessels.  However,  these  vessels 
appear  not  to  be  optimally utilized because  of  lack  of  equipment  such  as 
net  gauges,  lack  of personnel  and  lack  of training.  Further,  because  of 
the division of  competence  between Federal and  Lander authorities,  Lander 
vessels,  which  in principle are  limited to patrolling within  the  coastal 
band,  are  also obliged to  take  responsibility  for  the  waters  out towards 
Heligoland,  a  task  of  which  they  are  hardly  physically  capable.  The 
Federal  vessels,  which  are  physically  suitable,  are  permitted  to  act  in 
part  ~nly of this area  and only during the flatfish. season extending  from 
April to September. 
3.5.4  In  the past,  action  taken  when  infringements  at  s~a were  found  was  rela-
tively  weak,  e.g  •. sealing  rather  than  confiscating illegal  nets,  repor-
ting foreign  vessels  to their flag states rather than instituting procee-
dings  in  Germany.  There  are  indications  that  enforcement  action  is 
becoming more  robust. 
.;. - 9  -
3.6  Spa·in 
-3.6  •.  1  The  Commission  ·has  devoted  its  first. inspectors'  missions  to ·Spain ··to 
gaining  knowledge  of·  the  ·institutions ·and·  structure  of  control  of 
fishing.  At  this  stage it is  not  possible  to  make  more  than  tentative 
comments. 
3.6.2  It is  too  early  to  judge  the  accuracy  of  catch  reporting at port  level. 
The  treatment of  catch figures  by  the central authorities is in course  of 
adaptation;  so far,  no  monthly catch figures  have  reached the  Commission. 
3.7  France 
3-. 7.  -1  .:  . Quotas  are  managed . both  ·.by  the  professional · organizations  ·and  by  the 
administration. 
3.7.2  ..  There  are  a  number  of  weaknesses  in this  relatively unsophisticated  sys-
tem  residing inter alia in the fact that the management  by  the producers' 
organizations  seems  to cater more  for the  requirements  of the market  than 
for  the  demands  of  conservation  and  is  based  mainly  on  restrictions  on 
landings  of  certain species  rather  than  of  certain  stocks.  Further,  the 
percentage of  logbooks  returned seems  to be  low  in certain regions. 
3. 7.3  Catch  figures  are  obtained  mostly  from  the  auctions.  After  centrali-
zation  they  are  forwarded  to  the  Directorate  for  Fisheries  in  Paris, 
which  sends  them  on  to  the  Commission.  However,  sales  also  take  place 
outside  the  auction  halls.  They  may  be  large  and  a  month  may  elapse 
before the declarations relating to these sales are received  • 
.  ;. )  .:: 
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3.7.4  Furthermore,  despite  the  rec~nt restructuring  of  the  system  for  collec-
ting  catch  statistics,  France  is  the  country  which  forwards  the  catch 
reports  required under Article 9  of the Control Regulation to the Commis-
sion  most  belatedly,  on average,  in  198!;, J3. --~ys  ___ aft.er .the.deadline  .• . :  __  .......  _____ _  ""  '" ~~·---•·C•····- '·'··~"--• •f •• ''' ·-·• ,,,,  ·••-•••••••-••· •·  •-····•·· , ••••••• -- •··•···  •··~·-·••·•• "'  •·•• .,.,,, •·-,  •  • ·-•·• •• ,  •• •·-·••· '•  -
3. 7. 5  France  has  so  far  never  itself  called  a  halt  in  the  proper  manner  laid 
down  by  the Control Regulation to fishing by its fishermen  on·a stock the 
French  quota .for  which  was  exhausted.  Even  if such  a  decision  had  been 
taken,  ,the  legislative  procedure  would  have  been  too  slow  to  be 
effecti  v:e •  -~Currently~ -the  new  law  (No  85/842  of  22  May  1985),  which  has  .  .  ' 
adapted  ·French.· legislation  to  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy  and  which· 
provides  for  apparently  more  effective  procedures,  nevertheless  requires 
decrees,  none  of  which  has  yet  been  notified  to the  Commission~  France 
is  therefore still obliged  to  have  recourse  to  Commission  regulations  in 
order  to stop fishing. 
3.7.6  It also  happens  that  the  Commission  does  not  receive  the  requi=ed  infer-
rna tion  concerning  the  exhaustion  of  French  quotas  in  good  ti:ne,  which 
prevents it adopting in time  the  Community  regulations  needed in order to 
apply a  ban  on  fishing throughout  the whole  Community.  Once  a  Commission 
Regulation  has  been.  adopted,  the  genuinely  dissuasive  penalties  intro-
duced  under Law  No  85/542 -allow its effective application.  In  the past, 
a  system  of  fines  for  infringements  having  an  immediate  and· deterrent 
effect  did  not  exist  and  each  ban  on  fishing  imposed by  a  Commission 
Regulation  on  Frencl';l  fishermen  or  fishermen  of another Member  S-:ate  co~ld 
only be  implemented following  the  adoption  of  a  ministerial  ord~=· 
.;  . 
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3.7.7  Under  Article  12  of  the  Control  Regulation,  the  COmmission  has  requested 
France  to  carry out  an administrative inquiry into certain aspects of  the 
system of  recording  and notifying catches  and halting fishing. 
3.7.8  The  main  technical  measures  laid  down  in  Regulation  (EEC)  No  171/83  are 
not  complied  with  along  a  large  part  of  the  coast,  particularly  as 
regards  minimum  landing  sizes,  minimum  mesh  sizes,  the  rules  relating to 
3.7.9 
by-catches  and  the  use  of  attachments.  The  minimum  sizes  and  minimum 
mesh  sizes  commonly  used  deviate  considerably  from  those  imposed  by  the 
Community  rules. 
Confronted  with  this  rather  widespread  failure  to  comply  with  the  rules, 
France  made  a  commitment  to  the  Commission  to  conduct  a  campaign  in  the 
spring of  1985,  the  aim  of which  was  to  ensure  the  application  in the  end 
of  the  Community  technical  measures  relating  in  particular  to  minimum 
fish  and  mesh  sizes.  However,  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  such  a 
campaign  has  begun. 
3. 7. 10  The  checks  which  France  carries  out  at  sea  as  regards  compliance  with 
Community  rules  by  i.ts  own  nationals  are  relatively  infrequent  and 
ineffective.  Checks  appear  to  be  mainly  directed at Spanish  vessels  and 
compliance  with  national  measures,  the  main  aim  of  which  is  often  to 
prevent  conflicts  between  different categories of  fishermen  and  to  comply 
with  certain market  objectives. 
./. 
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3. 7. 11  As  for  the  relatively  infrequent  checks  the  aim  of  which  is  to  ensure 
compliance with  Community  technical measures  relating to conservation,  in 
most  cases  they  resulted in  an  official  report  followed  by  modest  fines 
which  hardly served to discourage  the infringement.  The  only progress in 
this field has  been the adoption of the  law  of May  1985  increasing fines  • 
3. 7 · 12  Whether  carried  out  at  sea  or  in  port,  checks  by  Commission  inspectors 
are  impeded  in  France  (visits  __ confirmed  or  cancelled  at  short  notice, 
refusal  by  officials  to  supply ~'appropriate statistics,  refusal  to  accept 
more  than  one  inspector  on  board  certain: surveillance  vessels  ••• ). 
.  . 
Furthermore,  the  advance  warning required before visits and  the  fact that 
visits  cannot  involve  inspection  of  anything  other  than  what  has  been 
agreed  means  that checks  carried out in the presence  of  Community  inspec-
tors  can  be  "prepared". 
3. 8  Ireland 
3.8.1  The  catch  recording system in Ireland is based  on  information provided by 
the  buyers.  There  is  almost  no  physical  control  of  quanti  ties  by  the 
control personnel.  The  catch  area is determined by  interviewing skippers 
or  by  assuming  that  the port of  landing is indicative of  the area.  There 
appears  to  have  been  no  attempt  to  compare  this  with  the  information 
available  from  logbooks. 
.· . . j. 
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· 3.8:.2  At  first  sight· Ireland's :r.ecord  for  not  exceeding ·its  quotas  is. respec-
table.  Thus.-in.1983  there .were  six cases.of overfishing,  two  in  1984  and 
one·in  1985;  and  of.these  cases. only  the  overfishing  of  mackerel  in  1983 
by  13%  (10,375  t.  on  a  quota of 80,000  t.)  can  be  considered significant. 
3.8.3  However,  closer  inspection  reveals  a  less  satisfactory  position. 
Firstly,  overfishing of  the  mackerel  quota  was  avoided  in  1985  (and pro-
bably  1984)  only  by  the  obtaining  of  additional  quantities  through 
exchanges  at  a  late  stage  under  Article  5  of  the  Basic  Regulation. 
Secondly,  there  are  indications  that  the  catch  registration  system is  in 
fact  abused.  Thus,  in  the  case  of Celtic Sea herring,  fished  to 99.9%  of 
its  quota  in  1984  and  1985,  there  is  evidence  that  the  catches  were 
under-declared  by  at least  15%,  precisely because of  the  lack  of physical 
-control  of quantities  landed. 
3.8.4  At  the  Commission's  request  an  administrative  inquiry,  in which  officials 
of  the  Commission  participated,  has  been  held  under  Article  12  of  the 
Control  Regulation  into  the  system  for  catch  registration  and  stopping 
fishing.  The  _report.  wa_s  reql,lested _for  30  April  1986  but  had  not  bee:: 
received  on  that  date. 
3.8.5  Subject  to  the  results  of  this  inquiry,  it appears  necessary  for  :relan~ 
to  improve  its system  for  controlling quantities  landed.  For  example,  i~ 
is  understood  that  Irish  fishery  officers  do  not  have  the  right  to  ins-
pect:  the  books  of  buyers  but  instead rely  on  summary  information  pr-ovide~ 
t\)  them  on  an  informal  basis;  the  lack  of  such  an  elementary  inspectic:-. 
power  is  surprising.  Similarly,  an  obligation on  skippers  to  provi~e  ~ar.~ 
calLbration  tables  would  simplify  the  control  of  pelagic  fisher.:.::s  bt;~ 
the  Commission's  suggestion  to  this  effect  has  only  just  been  a~cepte:: 
for possible  implementation  in  the  summer  of  1986. 
.;. 
!  . -~-: 
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3.8.6  A  national  measure  fcir  controlling  transshipments,  adopted  in  September 
-1985,--was- not  being-effectively-used- at least -in  the  early-months-of--its--- ------
existence  except  apparently  as  a  means  of  limiting  'mackerel 
transshipments  to  processing  vessels  in  the  interests  of  shore 
processors.  However,  Community  legislation 
recently  been  improved  by  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
amending  the Control  Regulation  (1). 
on  transshipments  has 
3723/85  of  20.12.1985 
3.8.7  The  major  fisheries  enforcement  problem  in .Ireland  has  probably  been  the 
failure  ~o ensure  compliance  with  technical  conservation measures  such  as 
Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  171/83.  The  failure  was  originally  based  on 
the  fact  that  Irish  national  measures  necessary  to  implement  the  Commu-
nity measures  were  missing;  so,  for  example,  fishermen  landing undersized 
fish  could not  be  prosecuted since  no  fine  had  been  fixed.  This  defect, 
which  rendered  nugatory  the  Community's  technical  conservation  measures, 
has  now  been  cured.  However,  the  reason  advanced  for  the  absence  of 
adequate  national  provisions,  namely  the  pressure  of  work  in  the  office 
responsible  for preparing them,  is not acceptable to the Commission. 
3.8.8  This  absence  of  national  measures  and  consequent  inability  to  pursue 
breaches  of  the  technical  conservation  measures  was  no  doubt  one  of  the 
reasons  why  enforcement  at  sea  has  in  the  past  been  directed  mainly  at 
non-Irish  vessels.  The-prosecution of  offences  discovered at sea  was,  in 
23  out of  24  cases  in  1984,  in  respect of  unauthorised fishing by  Spanish 
vessels  rather  than  breaches  of  technical measures. 
. I. 
( 1 )  OJ  No  L  361  of  3 1 • 12. 1985,  p.  42 • 
.  ~·· 
. :>·, ..  ·· ..  :·  ... - 15  -
3.8.9  Now  that  the  national  measures  necessary  to  implement  the  Community's 
technical  conservation measures  are  in  force  there  should  be  no  obstacle 
to  effective  enforcement.  The  Irish ·authorities  have  claimed  .that  the 
need to train personnel in inspection techniques  going beyond  the relati-
vely  simple  techniques  needed to  identify vessels  fishing without  autho-
rization  was  responsible  for  some  delay  in  enforcement.  It  is  the 
· Commission's  view  that  infringements  in  Irish  waters  are  still not  ye·t. 
adequately pursued. 
· 3. 8. 10  The  performance ·.thus  far  as  regards  inspection  at  sea  is  particularly 
disappointing given the major  investment of Community  money  in inspection 
vessels  and aircraft for  Ireland. 
3.8.l1  An  absence. of  national  measures  similarly  resu·lted'  in  an  inability  to 
.enforce  provisions  on  .logbooks  ·and  Commission  regulations  stopping 
fishing.- The  Commission  understands  that the necessary national measures 
are  now  in force. 
3.9  The Netherlands 
3.9.1  The  catch  registration system· is based on  sales  information obtained from 
auctions  or  first-hand  buyers  and  compared  with  landing declarations  and 
is supplemented by physical  checks  and  more  intensive control of business 
papers  in  the  case  of  certain fisheries.  The  flow  of  information origi-
nally  passed  through  a  semi-public  professional  organisation  but  is  now 
managed  by  the  relevant Ministry's General  Inspection Service. 
3.9.2  The  record  of  the  Netherlands  in  failing  to  prevent  overfishing  of  its 
quotas  is  the  poorest  of  all  the  Member  States  (11  cases  in  1983,  17  in 
1984,  25  in  1985  and  two  already  in  1986  - provisional  figure) .  The 
basic  cause  of  the  overfishing  is  no  doubt  to  be  found  in  the  overcapa-
city  of  important  sections  of  the  fleet  in  relation  to  the  quotas.  In 
these  circumstances  the  catch registration system and the  system  for. ore- .- . 
venting  overfishing  have  .proved  inadequate  for  their  task  despite~  .:the 
fact  that  in  1984  the  Netherlands  apparently  pro:::;ecuted  more  of  its 
fishermen  than  did  any  other  Member  State  and  that  increasing  numbers· of 
staff appear  to  have  been  devoted to enforcement. 
./  . 
. .. 
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3.9.3  The  catch  registration  system  has  failed  to  register  catches  accurately 
for  the following  reasons  : 
a)  the  "grey  market".  Under  this  system  catches  were  sold  through  the 
auctions  _but  a. s.i,gnificant. proportion of .. sole,. plaice and  cod  in -par-
ticular  was  not  recorded  as  such  and  was  sold  on  the  "grey  market"; 
information  on  these  sales  was  not  passed  to  the  Ministry  for  trans-
mission  to  the  Commission.  Various  methods  were  used  to  disguise 
which  vessels were  involved in grey market sales.  Under pressure  from 
the  Commission  the  Netherlands,  with  some  delay,  took  administrative 
and  legal  action  with  the  result  that,  so  far as  can  be  ascertained, 
the  grey market  has  now  been virtually eliminated; 
b)  the  black  market.  This  term  covers  direct  sales  by  fishermen  to mer-
chants  of parts of  landings which  are. not registered.  It seems  possi-
ble  that  a  proportion  of  what  were  formerly  grey  market  sales is  now 
black market sales;  the Commission is looking into this; 
c)  false attribution of  catch areas  ("dumping"  of catches).  Thus  catches 
of fish  from  a  stock which  is under pressure are attributed to another 
stock  where  the Netherlands  has  either  a  small  or  no  quota.  As  a  re-
sult  the  Netherlands  overfishing,  as  shown  by  its  official  figures, 
probably  appears  worse  than it is  because  of  the  apparent  overfishing 
of  a  large  number  of small  or  zero  quotas.  In  fact  the  fish  concer-
ned  has  largely been  taken  elsewhere,  usually  in  the•. North  Sea.  This 
problem may  be  reduced in  1986  since the Netherlands  has  transferred a 
number  of  small  quotas  to  another  Member  State  and  taken  a  national 
measure  to prevent false  claims  of  catches in certain areas; 
d)  false  declaration of  species.  The  best-known  example  of this  concerns 
declarations  of  mackerel  as  horse-mackerel;  the  Commission  ordered  an 
administrative  inquiry  into  this  in  1984  which  revealed  that  90,650 
tonnes  of  mackerel  had  been  landed by  30  April  1984  but  only  27,550 
tonnes  had  been  declared.  Although  the  Netherlands  authorities  have 
since been  carrying out  checks  of  cold store  records  in order to pre-
vent  a  repetition  the  Commission  has  again  obtained  evidence  in  1986 
of  the  same  infringement  and  has  once  again  requested  an 
administrative inquiry,  which  has  begun. 
.;. i-
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3.9.4  In  response  to  the  intense pressure  on  certain stocks  resulting from  the 
over-capacity  of  the  fleet  the  Dutch  authorities  have  made  efforts  to 
ensure  a  more  effective distribution of the national quotas, -enforce  lon-
ger periods  of  lay-up  for  the  fleet  and  increase  minimum  fish sizes.  In 
theory  the  Conununi ty  measures  and  the  comprehensive  national  measures 
3.9.5 
3.9.6 
should  be  sufficient  to  prevent  the  overfishing.  However,  some  overfi-
shing  continues  and  it must  be  concluded  that  fishermen  are  not  being 
effectively  restrained  by  the  risk  of  being  caught  or  by  the  penalties 
applied if they  are  convicted. 
Despite  the  effort  which  has  to  be  devoted  to  preventing  overfishing, 
control  of  technical  conservation  measures  on  land  appears ·to  be·  good. 
Sea-going inspection is carried out  by units of  the  Royal  Navy  and of  the 
police.  There  are  fairly  generalized  breaches  of  the  rules  on  attach-
ments  to  nets  and  on  beam-trawling  within  twelve  miles.  Despite  an 
increasing  effort  at  training,  the  lack  of  knowledge  and  experience  of 
Community  legislation and fishing practices results in a  relatively inef-
fective  control  at  sea  which  does  little  to  help  the  control  effort  on 
land. 
3.9.7  The  possible  pr~vatisation of at least one  important  fish  auction  in the 
Netherlands  is under. consideration;  it would  be  important  to  ensure  that 
any  such  development  did not adversely affect enforcement. 
3.10  Portugal 
3. 10. 1  As  with  Spain,  the  first  visits  by  Commission  inspectors  can  suggest 
only  tentative  conclusions  and  the  position  is  again  complicated  by 
current  changes.~n responsibilities of the various  government  bodies  con-
cerned with  enforcement. 
.;. 
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3.10.2  Registration  of  catches passing through  the  auctions  seems  to  be  adequa-
tely organized at port level although there appear to be  problems further 
along the  chain.  Monthly  catch figures  have  not yet  reached the Commis-
sion.  Catches  which  do  not  pass  through  the  auction  system appear to be 
quite  large  and it is not  clear to the Commission  that these are  registe~ 
red. 
3.10.3  Quota  management  is not yet practised.  The  limited observation which  has 
been  made  so  far  suggests  that  more  effort  may  be  devoted  to  enforcing 
minimum  mesh  sizes  than minimum  fish sizes. 
3.11  United Kingdom 
3 .,11. 1  The  catch  recording  system  is  based  on  landing  declarations  or  sales 
notes  supplemented  by  comparison  with  logbooks,  physical  spot  checks  and 
interviews  with  skippers.  For  the  most  part  the  system  appears  to  be 
functioning  properly.  However,  there  was  until  recently  a  significant 
under-registration  of  whitefish  landings  in  Scottish  ports.  The 
under-registration  resulted  from  the  fact  that  boxes  of  fish  i:1  these 
ports  were  rarely  weighed  but  were  deemed  to  contain  an  average  weight; 
this  deemed  average  weight  was  in fact  less  than  the  real average weight 
as  discovered  by  checkweighing.  The  deemed  average  weight  has  now  been 
increased  to  the  level  required  by  the  results  of  checkweighing.  The 
same  problem  has  on  occasions  been  noticed  in  other  United  Kingdom  ports 
but  on  a  much  less  significant scale. 
3. 11.2 It is  also  likely  that there  is  some  inaccurate  registration  of  landings 
in  the  south  and  south-east  of  England  due  to  the  large  number  o:  ports 
with· relatively.  small  landings..  Extra  resources  have  been  prov:.ded  to 
correct  such  inaccuracy. 
.;. 
.,  .·  ..........  -.:  ·  .. -19  -
3.11.3  The  United  Kingdom  deploys  a  wide  range  of  measures  to avoid overfishing 
based mainly  on  the system of pressure stock licences which  allows flexi-
_ .ble  and  responsive  control.  In  1983  there  were  nevertheless  nine  cases 
of quotas  being overfished,  in  1984  seventeen  and  in  1985  ten  (provisio-
nal  figure).  However  it  was  not  considered  that  the  pattern  of 
overfishing,  when  more  closely  analyzed,  gave  grounds  for  serious 
concern. 
3.11.4 The  United  Kingdom  does  not  fully  comply  with  article  10(2)  of  the  con-
trol  Regulation  (provisional prohibition  of  fishing  by  Member  State  upon 
a  quota  being  exhausted)  since  its normal  procedure  for  halting  a  fishe-
ry,  the  suspension of  licences,  does  not  cover  vessels  under  teri metres. 
3. 11.5  A  considerable  amount  of  resources  is  devoted  to  enforcement  at  sea  as 
shown  by  Annex  I;  this  appears  to  have  a  significant  deterrent  effect  on 
the  commission  of  breaches  of  the  technical conservation measures  by  ves-
sels  of  all  flags  fishing  in  the  U.K.  fishery  zone.  Most  of  the  few 
breaches  observed  in port  have  been  the  subject  of  penal  or administra-
ti  ve  action.  An  exception  to  this  is  Northern  Ireland  where  little 
action appears  to be  taken about  landings of  undersized nephrops  tails. 
3. 12  General  comments 
3.12.1  Certain general  comments  can  be  made  on  the basis  of  the  above  account  of 
the  enforcement situation in the Member  States. 
3. 12.2  On  the  basis  of  the  catch  figures  notified  by  the  Member  States,  the 
incidence  of  declared  overfishing  in  the  Community  is  generally 
decreasing.  However,  the  performance  of  the  Member  States  is  very 
uneven,  and  some  of  the  officially-declared  catch  figures  may  be 
understatements.  _The  Commission's  aim  is the  complete  elimination of  all 
overfishi!fg  and,  bearing  in  mind  the  practical  difficulty  of  stopping 
fishing  exactly  on  a  quota,  there  is still evident  need  for  improvement 
before an-acceptable situation is reached. 
. I. 
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3. 12.3  However,  overfishing,  although  a  breach of the  relevant provisions of the 
Counci  1 
1 s  annual  Regulations  on  TACs  and  quptas,  is  more  importantly  a 
symptom  of  deeper ills,  such as  faults  in the  catch registration or quota 
management  systems.  For  example,  it  is  noticeable  that  there  is  very 
- ----· 
little  physical  counting  of  landings  by  the  control  authorities  of  the 
Member  States.  Again,  the  inability  after  three  years  of  most  Member 
States  to  provide  their  monthly  catch  figures  by  the  fifteenth  of  the 
following  month  as  required  by  article  9 ( 2)  of  the  Control  Regulation 
suggests  that they  have  not yet mastered the  situation. 
3.12.4  A  particular  word  needs  to.  be  said  about  the  logbooks/landing  declara-
tions  introduced by  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2807/83  as  from  1  April  1985  for 
the  Ten  (1).  These,  it is  hoped,  will  make  a  useful  contribution  inter 
alia to  the  catch  registration systems  of  the  Member  States.  The  Corilin'is..; 
sian  undertook  to  review  the  use  of  the  logbooks  and  landing declarations 
two  years  after their introduction and it is  not  intended to preempt  this 
review  here.  All  Member  States  decided  to  give  their  fishermen  a  period 
in  which  to adjust to  the  new  requirements  but  some  though  not all Member 
States  have  apparently  now  started  to  enforce  the  use  of  these  docu-
ments.  In  order  that  the  review  should  not  be  devalued  by  any  Member 
State 
1 s  failure  to  enforce  the  logbook  measures  the  Commission  will  be 
giving  special  attention  during  the  rest  of  1986  to  checking  or:  their 
application. 
./~ 
l1)  and  to  be  used by  Portuguese  and Spanish  vess~ls  from~ Jtily  1986 . 
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. :3·• 12. 5  T~e Conunission' s  inspectors. frequently  witness  breaches ·of  the  technical 
.conservation  measures.  There  appear  to  be  cases  where  the  breaches  are 
so  widespread  that  they  are  endangering  conservation  and  putting  at 
serious  risk  the  principle  referred  to  in  the  Introduction,  i.e.  that 
restrictions  must  be  enforced  equally  in  all  the  Member  States  concer-
ned.  Sometimes  the  Member  States have  made  serious efforts to curb these 
widespread  evasions  even  at  considerable  political  cost.  Sometimes, 
however,  a  Member  State  has  made  virtually  no  effort at  enforcement  and 
has  given. the  Conunission  little  help  in.  its  attempts ··to.  pursue  the 
matter.  More  generally,  Member  States  make  some  effort  at  enforcement 
but this effort is not  adequate  to eliminate  the  breaches. 
3.12.6  A particular  facet  of  the  problem  Of  the  enforcement_of  technical measu-
res  is  that  detection  of  offences  often  needs  to  take  place  at  sea,  in 
particular for  mesh  sizes· and  attachments  to nets. ·  This  is an  expensive 
method  of  qontrol  of  \ihich  the  standard  ... varies  greatly  from  one  Member 
State  to  another.  Most  sea-going  control  is  carried  out  by  vessels 
belonging  to  government  departments  whose  main  priority  is  not  fishe-
ries.  The  standard of training,  the  design  of  the vessels,  the degree  of 
priority  and  the  efficiency  of  the  control  are  not  always  commensurate 
with  the  task. 
.;  . 
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3. 12.7  Finally,  it should  be  said  that  the  Commission  understands  that  Member 
States  have  different  geographies,  different problems,  different resour-
/ 
ces  and  different  traditions  and  these  need  realistically  to  be  taken 
into  account  by  the  Commission  in  assessing  their  performance.  The 
Commission .cannot,  however, 
'  .  ac.cept  the  argument  that  a  Member  State  is 
entitled to  wait  for  other  Member  States  to  come  up  to its level  before 
it improves  its  own  enforcement  or  that  weaknesses  in  one  Member  State 
justify  the  relaxation  of  standards  achieved  in  another  Member  State. 
The process  of  harmonisation  upwards  of  the standard of  enforcement  which 
has  begun  needs  to  be  pursued vigorously. 
4.  ROLE  OF  THE  COMMISSION 
4.1  Monitoring of Member State enforcement of  conservation measures 
4.1.1  Article  12  of  the  Control  Regulation  states  the  role  of  the Commission's 
inspectorate  (details  of  which  are  given  in  Annex  II)  by  defining  its 
powers.  This Article has  to be  read in the context of Article  155  of  the 
Treaty of  Rome. 
4.1.2  The  inspectors  began  to  make  visits  to  the  Member  States  in autumn  1983. 
·The  CommissiOii"  wishes  to  make  a  number  of  observations  in  the  light  of 
experience  gained in the  intervening period. 
./. 
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.4. 1 •. 3  D.espite  the·  weaknesses·  of .application  which  have· ·.been· identified,· the 
c.urrent  basic  policy,  ·Under  which  the . Member  States  are. responsible·. for 
enforcement  in  their ·-territory  and  in  ·waters· .corning  under  their· j.uris- · 
diction- and  the  Commission- is  responsible  for  ensuring that this ·duty  is· · 
properly  discharged,  is sound  and  should be  continued. 
4.1.4. The  Commission  does  not  seek direct powers  of enforcement against private 
citizens  in  this  field.  Its  preference  is  that  its  inspectors  should 
continue  to operate by  accompanying national inspectors or other national 
officials who  remain  responsible  for inspections. 
4. 1. 5  .Existing  Community  legis-lation• -:is  nevertheless  inadequate ·to  enable  the 
... Comm_ission  properly to discharge its task of verifying the ·implementation 
of  the  Control  Regulation.  There  are  the  following  deficiencies  : 
not all national  inspectorates  inspect  or are  empowered  to inspect all 
the  areas,  operations and activities whose  inspection  can  be  useful  or 
necessary  in order to  ensure  compliance  with  the .conservation  and  con-
trol  regulations.  To  take  an  example  mentioned  earlier,  the  inspec-
tors  of  one  Member  State  appear  to  have  no  power  to  inspect  the  books 
of  fish  buyers.  Since  the  Commission  inspectors  operate  by  accompa-
nying  national  inspectors  such  weaknesses  prevent  the  Commission  from 
properly  discharging  its  own  task  of  verifying  the  implementation  of 
the Control  Regulation. 
.;. 
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the  effectiveness  of  Corrunission  inspectors  ·limited  to  accompanying 
national  inspectors  can  be  significantly  reduced  by  lack  of  full  co-
operation  from  the  Member  State or  the  national  inspectorate - if,  for 
example,  an  appropriate  inspection  programme  cannot  be  agreed  or  if, 
during  a  visit,  the  national  inspector  fails ,to  appear  or  is  unwil-
ling to inspect  a  particular catch or vessel.  Again,  Commission  offi-
cials may  be  shown  only  situations specially prepared  for  them.  More-
over,  some  Member  States  have  objected to  Commission  inspectors  visi-
ting  ports  not  on  their  programme  but  which  are  accessible  to  the 
public  or speaking to  fishermen  in  the  absend~ of  national  inspectors. 
4. 1.6  These  problems  were  raised by  the  Commission  during the Council's  discus-
sions  in  autumn  1985  of  the  proposal  to  modifi  the  Control  Regulatio:~ 
(COM(85)  490  final  of  17  September  1985).  Certain  Member  States  sugges-
ted  that  the  problems  were  adequately  dealt  with  by  the  Commission's 
right  to  require  an  administrative inquiry  under-Article  12  of  that  Regu-
lation  or  to  institute  proceedings  under  Article  169  of  the  Treaty. 
However,  this  suggestion  does  not  take  account ;f the  fact  that .both  tr.-: 
above  procedures  presuppose  that  the  Commission  has  evidence  of  "an  irre-
gularity"  (Article  12)  or  of  "a  failure  tc>- fulfil  an  obligatior.·· 
(Article  169).  The  Conunission  cannot  necessarily obtain  such  evide:1ce  L-. 
th<~  ci.t-cumstanccs  outlined above. 
4. 1. 7  The  commission·  wishes  to  emphasize  that  on  mOst  ocdas·ioris  it  has·  bee:-. 
granted  the  utmost  co-operation  by  the  nation~l  control  authorities  a~~ 
indeed  by  the  fishermen  themselves.  However,  the  Commission  must  also  t::: 
equipped  to  deal  with  those  cases  where  co-operation  has  not  been  :o:::t!-.- · 
coming  and  where  obstacles  have  even  been placed  in  its  way . 
.  ;. 
,,#• 
··•'·.····  .....  :,  :~.  .\  :,  .. ;~.~,:..,  .. - 25  -
4 .. 1 .:a.·· ·  The·;.Conunission,  therefore,  considers· that .. it is ·  .. ·necessary . to . prov.ide  in 
general  that  it  can  require  that  a  mission  by  Commission  inspectors 
should  take  place  in  a  certain  region,  port,  or  institution  at  a  given 
time -and  that therefore  national inspectors should  be. available,  whom  the 
Conunission  inspectors would  accompany.  The  power  would also .be  available 
at a  detailed level,  during  the  course of  a  mission,  to enable  Commission 
inspectors  to  require,  if  necessary,  that  a  par-ticular  catch  be  inspec-
ted,  a  particular net  measured. 
4. 1. 9  'l'he  Conunission  further  considers  that  it  is  necessary  for  the  Membe:-
States.  to  ensure  that  their  inspectorates  have  the  powers  required  tc 
enable  them- to  inspect  and  monitor  all  operations  and  activities  whose 
inspection  and  monitoring  are  calculated  to  ensure  compliance  with  the 
whole  range  of  conservation  and  control  measures.  Member  .states  need 
also  to  ensure  that  the  right  of  Cornmiss ion  inspectors  to  accompany 
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4.2  Need  for stricter application of Community  rules on  markets 
4.2.1  The  Commission  takes  this  _oppor.tun~t;y  of  dr_awing  ~he_ atten1:;__ion  9_f  tl:le 
Council  to  the  problem  of  compliance  with  certain  provisions  of  the 
Community  rules  governing  the  markets  in  fishery  products  which  have  to 
be  applied  correctly  and  uniformly  by  all  the  Member  States  if  the  EEC 
market  organization is to operate efficiently. 
4. 2. 2  In  the  course  of  their  control  duties,  the  Commission  inspectors  have 
identified  certain  cases  where  the  rules  have  not  been  applied  in  full 
4. 2. 3 
(provisions  r<~lating  to  EEC  marketing  standards  and  the  vario~.;s 
intervention  schemes,  etc.) .  Attention  has  also  been  drawn  to  some  o= 
these  cases  by  the  Court  of  Auditors  in  its special  report  on  the  market 
organization  (1). 
The  Commission  takes  the  view  that  compliance  with  these  rules  requires 
more  thorough  inspection.  While  noting  that  responsibility  fo:::- sue:-: 
inspection  lies  primarily  with  the  Member  States,  the  Commission  feel.s 
that  there  is  an  imperative  need  to  ensure  the  full  and  uniform  appl~ca­
tion  of  the  provisions  relating -to  the  EEC  market  organization,  r.otabl:,; 
by  means  of  inspections  of  a  Community  character  to  be- perforned  :0:::_.-
a·gents  of  the  Commission  by  methods- to  be  determined~ 
4 · 2 • 4  The  Commission  reserves  the  right_ to  return to  th·is ·subject  . 
.  ;. 
{ 1)  OJ  No  C  339  of  31  December  1985. 
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',  <.~  ~  ·  .. J.:.:..  ~  .:~ - 27 -
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
5.1.  Th~ prime  importance of  the  enforcement  element  of  the  common  fisheries 
policy  was  demonstrated  in .the  Introd~ction to this  report. 
5._2.  The  Community's  fisheries  conservation policy was  adopted  rather  more  than 
three years  ago.  The  intervening  period  can  be  regarded  as  having  been 
a  transitional  period  involving  a  learning  process  for  both  the  Commission 
and  the  Member  States.  In  so  far  as  enforcement  is  concerned,  the  Commission 
has  made  an  effort  to  show  particular understanding of  the  real  enforcement 
difficulties arising  from  the  various  situations of  the  Member  States. 
Accordingly,  it has  concentrated  its efforts on  persuading  the  Member  States 
that  effective operation of the  policy  is in their interest  and  i~ that 
of  the  fisheries  sector.  It  has  eschewed  the  pursuit  of  procedures  under 
Article  169  of  the  Treaty  in  all  but  the  most  flagrant  cases  of  violation. 
The  Commission  has  also  made  proposals  to the  Council  for  the  reinforcement 
of  Community  Legislation  where  this  has  appeared  necessary.  Unfortunately, 
the  Council  has  only  adopted  part  of  the  proposals  put  before  it. 
-5.3.  This  report  has-shown  that since·January  1983  the  Member-States  ha~e made 
discernible  but  uneven  progress  towards  improved  enforcement.  However, 
there  are still significant weaknesses  and  clear differenc-es  in  ~nforceme~t 
performance  a~ between  the  Member  St~tes.  The  weakne~~es include  :_ 
.  -··  .  ~  '  . . -
the  lack  in  several  Member  States of  adequate  national  measures 
to  render  Community  legislation effective  ; 
differences  as  between  Member  States ~nd weaknesses. in  material  provision 
fa~_enforcement, to  a  degree difficult  to explain  by·  differences  in 
geography  or  in  the  structure of  the  various  fleets  ; 
a  range  of  defici.encies,  many  of  them  serious,  in  real ·enforcement--
performance  ; 
lack .ot.suffi.ciertLcaoperation on  some  occasions  by  the''national 
author.i.ties  wi-th--the. Commission  inspectorate·.  "'  ,-..  .  ':' 
.  /. 
l 
\  -
...  ...  t • ) 
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5.4.  This  situation  cannot  be  allowed  to  continue.  The  Commission  is  of  the 
view  that  the  transitional  period  mentioned  above  must  be  considered  to 
be  at  an  end.  The  Member  States  should  now  be  in  a  position  to  fulful  their 
obligations  and  to  ensure  the effective  operatio~_of the  pol~cy~ To  this 
- +  •  ••  •  - • 
end,  the  Commission  will  continue  to  cooperate  closely with  the  Member 
States  in  pursuing  the  necessary  improvements.  It will  also  make  the 
maximum  use  of  the  various  means  available  to  it for  ensuring  the  high 
level  of  enforcement  which  the  maintenance  of  a  credible  common  fisheries 
policy  requires.  These  means  include  : 
calling  for  administrative  inquiries  by  the  Member  States  under 
Article  12  of  the  Control  Regulation  ; 
the  presentation of  proposals  for  improvements  in  Community  legislation 
concerning  the duties  of  the  Member  States  and  the  powers  of  the 
Commission  in  relation to enforcement,  including  consideration  of  a 
complementary  role  for  the  Commission  in  the  enforcement  of  certain 
market  regulations.  The  Commission  looks  to  the  Council  as  legislator 
to  ensure  speedy  adoption  of  all  its proposals. 
In  addition,  where  the  circumstances  require,  the  Commission  will  not  hesitate 
to  use  the  powers  provided  under  Article  169  of  the  Treaty  to  require  Member 
States  to  comply  with  their  Community  obligations. : 
... 
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NetherlandsiPortugal 
Min.Agr.  74 













Min.  Agriculture and 
Fisheries England and 
Wales  : 
Opt.  Agriculture and 
Fisheries Scotland  : 
Opt.  Agriculture Nor-
thern Ireland  : 
1)  Min.  A.and F. 
2)  Dpt.A and F.Scotl. 
3)  "Salloon patrol 
vessels" 
1)  40.080 
2)  24.162 
3)  16.572 
1)  100% 
2)  100% 
3)  100% 
1)  1 Cessna 
2 )  1 Islander 
3)  various Nimrods 
4)  1 Cessna 404  Titan 












ANNEX  II 
THE  COMMISSION'S  INSPECTORATE 
The  Commission's  inspectorate  currently  consists  of  13  inspectors, 
recruited mainly  from  the  national  inspectorates  on  temporary  contracts. 
The  inspectors  come  from  the  following  Member  States  :  one  from  each  of 
Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Spain  (to be  appointed),  Ireland and  Portugal; 
two  from  each  of  France  and  the  Netherlands;  three  from  the  United 
Kingdom. 
In  its  P-!="eliminary  draft  budget  for  1986  the  Commission  proposed  an 
increase  in the  number  of  inspectors  to  21.  During  consideration  of  the 
draft  budget  the  Fisheries  Sub-Committee  of  the  European  Parliament 
tabled  an  amendment  proposing  an  increase  in  DG  XIV's  personnel, 
including  these  eight  extra  posts  for  the  inspectorate.  However,  this 
amendment  was  not  accepted by  the  Budgetary Committee. 
Since  autumn  1983,  130  missions  have  been  carried out,  generally  lasting 
between  one  and  two  weeks.  By  Member  State the  breakdown is as  follows  : 
Belgium  10 
Derunark  16 
Germany  12 
Spain  4 
France  26 
Ireland  15 
Netherlands  17 
Portugal  4 
'  ..  United Kingdom  26 
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